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Abstract:		
A	 key	 component	 of	 (neo)functionalist	 and	 constructivist	 approaches	 to	 the	 study	 of	
international	 organizations	 concerns	 staff	 socialization.	 Existing	 analyses	 of	 how,	 or	
indeed	 whether,	 staff	 develop	 more	 pro-internationalist	 attitudes	 over	 time	 draw	
predominantly	 on	 cross-sectional	 data.	 Yet,	 such	 data	 cannot	 address	 (self-)selection	
issues	or	capture	the	inherently	temporal	nature	of	attitude	change.	This	article	proposes	
an	 innovative	 approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 international	 socialization	 using	 an	 explicitly	
longitudinal	 design.	 Analyzing	 two	waves	 of	 a	 large-scale	 survey	 conducted	within	 the	
European	Commission	in	2008	and	2014,	it	examines	the	beliefs	and	values	of	the	same	
individuals	 over	 time	 and	 exploits	 exogenous	organizational	 changes	 to	 identify	 causal	
effects.	 Furthermore,	 the	 article	 theorizes	 and	 assesses	 specified	 scope	 conditions	
affecting	 socialization	 processes.	 Showing	 that	 international	 institutions	 do	 in	 fact	
influence	value	acquisition	by	individual	bureaucrats,	our	results	contest	the	widely	held	
view	that	international	organizations	are	not	a	socializing	environment.	Our	analysis	also	
demonstrates	that	age	at	entry	and	gender	significantly	affect	the	intensity	of	such	value	
change.		
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Introduction	
International	Relations	 (IR)	scholars	studying	 Intergovernmental	Organizations	 (IGOs)	have	
mainly	been	preoccupied	with	the	conditions	underlying	the	emergence,	proliferation	and	
autonomy	of	 those	 institutions.1	Still,	how,	and	 indeed	whether,	 IGOs	shape	the	values	of	
the	people	who	work	for	them	is	no	less	important.	As	functionalist	scholars	including	Ernst	
B.	 Haas	 and	 James	 Sewell	 first	 asserted,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 individuals	 acquire	
internationalist	 attitudes	 while	 working	 for	 an	 IGO	 contributes	 to	 that	 organization’s	
capacity	 to	 establish	 its	 independence	 from	member	 state	 principals	 (Haas,	 1964;	 Sewell,	
1966;	Wolf,	 1973;	 Checkel,	 2005).	 The	 experience,	 expertise,	 and	 values	 of	 IGO	 staff	 are	
therefore	 fundamental,	 and	 identifying	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 individuals	 acquire	
internationalist	 values	 as	 well	 as	 the	 factors	 that	 affect	 their	 acquisition	 is	 an	 important	
undertaking	with	significant	implications.2	
	
Previous	empirical	studies	of	value	acquisition	by	IGO	staff	have	provided	decidedly	mixed	
results	 (see,	 e.g.,	Gheciu,	 2005	and	 Lewis,	 2005	 versus	Beyers,	 2005	and	Hooghe,	 2005).3	
Yet,	if	the	values	of	personnel	affect	the	capacity	of	IGOs	to	fulfil	their	missions,	the	absence	
of	 a	 clear	 understanding	of	 value	 acquisition	 is	 a	 serious	 gap.	Drawing	on	 individual-level	
data	 and	 employing	 a	 longitudinal	 research	 design	 appropriate	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	
socialization	as	a	diachronic	process,	 this	article	 revisits	 the	socializing	power	of	 IGOs	and	
aims	to	advance	its	understanding.	It	also	takes	up	the	challenge	of	testing	and	refining	the	
scope	conditions	under	which	 IGOs	can	be	expected	 to	 trigger	 socialization	effects.	Scope	
conditions	are	singled	out	since	they	provide	an	opportunity	to	better	understand	the	often	
weak	 and	 ambiguous	 socialization	 effects	 observed	 in	 previous	 studies	 (Wolf,	 1973;	
Johnston,	2005;	Zürn	and	Checkel,	2005).	Our	empirical	analysis	thereby	takes	the	European	
																																																						
1	 For	an	excellent	critical	discussion,	 see	Gruber	 (2000).	 In	 sharp	contrast,	 the	 internal	 structures,	processes	
and	operation	of	IGOs	have	received	much	less	attention.	Auderfuhren-Biget	et	al.	(2012:	270),	for	instance,	
poignantly	 observe	 that	 “reviews	 of	 the	 IO	literature	 (…)	 barely	 touch	on	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 IOs	 function	
internally”.	
2	How	individuals	acquire	their	values	–	i.e.	from	the	workplace	environment,	self-selection	and	recruitment,	
or	cultural	background	–	has	long	been	of	key	interest	across	the	social	sciences	(e.g.,	Chatman,	1991;	Gleibs	
et	al.,	2008;	Kjeldsen	and	Jacobsen,	2013).	Defined	as	the	process	through	which	individuals	acquire	values	
and	“adapt	their	(…)	behavioural	practices,	norms	about	appropriateness	and	preferences	about	outcomes”	
(Beyers,	2010),	 socialization	has	 thereby	been	closely	examined	by	sociologists,	psychologists,	and	political	
scientists.	
3	Wolf	(1973)	presents	a	review	of	earlier	studies	with	similarly	mixed	findings.	
	 4	
Commission	 as	 a	 critical	 case.4	 Matching	 information	 across	 two	 surveys	 of	 individuals’	
values	and	attitudes	conducted	six	years	apart	–	in	2008	and	2014	–	our	results	demonstrate	
that	 IGOs	 are	 indeed	 “social	 environments”	 that	 shape	 the	 values	 of	 international	
bureaucrats	(Johnston,	2001).	
	
Socialization	and	international	bureaucrats:	the	state	of	the	literature	and	beyond	
A	 2005	 special	 issue	 of	 International	 Organization	 on	 “International	 Institutions	 and	
Socialization	in	Europe”	offered	the	first	systematic	attempt	to	examine	value	acquisition	by	
IGO	 staff.	 Although	 contributors	 to	 the	 volume	 fell	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 debate,	
interpretation	 of	 the	 findings	 by	 subsequent	 IR	 scholarship	 has	 been	 less	 equivocal.	 The	
special	 issue	 is	routinely	referenced	as	the	 locus	classicus	of	a	demonstration	that	there	 is	
no	 evidence	 of	 international	 socialization.5	 Whichever	 way	 the	 special	 issue	 is	 read,	 the	
contributions	to	it	share	two	generic	shortcomings	of	analyses	of	international	socialization	
in	the	IR	literature	that	derive	ultimately	from	limitations	of	the	data	available	to	scholars	at	
the	time.	
	
Socialization	as	a	diachronic	process		
The	first	shortcoming	is	methodological.	Socialization	is	a	diachronic	process	that	concerns	
the	acquisition	or	change	 in	values	over	time.	Nevertheless,	virtually	all	existing	studies	of	
socialization	 in	 IGOs	depend	on	 cross-sectional	 datasets	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Beyers,	 2005;	Hooghe,	
2005;	Lewis,	2005;	Suvarierol	et	al.,	2013).	Possible	socialization	effects	are	typically	inferred	
from	 “the	 number	 of	 years	 someone	 was	 involved	 in	 a	 particular	 venue”	 (Beyers,	 2010:	
914).	Yet,	an	analysis	of	the	values	held	at	one	point	in	time	by	individuals	who	have	worked	
in	 the	organization	 for	 periods	of	 differing	 length	 cannot	 resolve	potential	 (self-)selection	
issues	 or	 capture	 the	 temporal	 nature	 of	 socialization	 processes	 (Martin	 and	 Simmons,	
																																																						
4	Like	Hooghe	(2005:	861)	and	Checkel	(2005),	we	believe	that	the	Commission	is	“a	crucial	case	for	examining	
socialization	within	an	international	organization”	because	it	occupies	a	central	position	in	the	world’s	most	
encompassing	 supranational	 regime.	 The	 Commission	 is	 also	 of	 particular	methodological	 and	 theoretical	
interest,	since	it	witnessed	several	structural	reorganizations	in	2010-2011	as	well	as	senior	managerial	staff	
rotations	over	the	2009-2014	period.	As	these	changes	did	not	affect	all	Commission	staff	equally,	they	can	
be	 exploited	 in	 a	 difference-in-differences	 identification	 strategy	 (see	 below).	 Such	 an	 approach	 explicitly	
builds	on	a	longitudinal	analysis,	and	allows	stronger	causal	inferences	compared	to	cross-sectional	analyses	
(Bertrand	et	al.	2004).	
5	Hooghe	(2005)	is	thereby	most	frequently	cited,	and	has	come	to	be	regarded	as	the	dominant	wisdom	(e.g.,	
Avant	et	al.,	2010;	Linos,	2011;	Ege	and	Bauer,	2013).	
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1998;	Beyers,	2010).	It	necessarily	involves	either	inferring	changes	in	values	stated	at	time	t	
or	the	correct	recollection	of	values	reported	at	the	time	of	recruitment.	Hence,	the	validity	
of	such	an	approach	is	questionable,	and	it	certainly	does	not	allow	causal	inferences	about	
individual-level	socialization.	A	single	cross-section	has	severe	and	inherent	limitations.		
	
In	 contrast,	 this	 article	 employs	 a	 longitudinal	 two-wave	 survey	 research	 design	 that	 is	
inspired	by	 the	use	of	 longitudinal	data	 in	private-sector	 settings	and	 (sub)national	public	
administrations	in	the	organizational	socialization	literature	(Saks	and	Ashforth,	1997;	Gleibs	
et	 al.,	 2008;	 Kjeldsen	 and	 Jacobsen,	 2013;	 Hatmaker	 and	 Park,	 2014).	 To	 the	 best	 of	 our	
knowledge,	we	are	the	first	to	apply	a	similar	approach	to	the	study	of	IGOs.	This	is	possible	
due	 to	 the	 availability	 of	 data	 from	 two	 projects	 on	 the	 European	 Commission	 –	 “The	
European	Commission	 in	Question”	and	“European	Commission:	Facing	the	Future”	 (more	
details	 below)	 –	 which	 collected	 detailed	 information	 on	 staff	 backgrounds,	 beliefs	 and	
values.	The	surveys	were	administered	six	years	apart	–	in	2008	and	2014	respectively	–	so	
as	to	permit	investigation	of	changes	over	time.	Since	protecting	the	anonymity	of	staff	was	
a	condition	 for	gaining	access,	 it	was	necessary	 to	develop	a	 technique	 that	 links	 the	 two	
samples	 and	 makes	 inter-temporal	 comparisons	 possible	 without	 revealing	 individual	
identities.	We	present	and	employ	this	technique	below	to	evaluate	attitude	change	in	the	
same	individuals	over	time.	
	
Socialization	scope	conditions	
A	second	widely	observed	shortcoming	of	IR	scholarship	on	socialization	is	theoretical.	The	
institutional	and	individual	scope	conditions	that	can	facilitate	or	impede	processes	of	value	
acquisition	 are	 often	 unspecified	 or,	where	 they	 are	 specified,	 not	 submitted	 to	 rigorous	
testing	(Zürn	and	Checkel,	2005;	Ashforth	et	al.,	2007).	The	nature	of	our	sample	(discussed	
in	detail	below)	makes	 it	possible	to	refine	the	scope	conditions	under	which	 IGOs	can	be	
expected	to	trigger	socialization	effects.	We	focus	on	three	elements.		
	
First,	 we	 test	 whether	 socialization	 processes	 are	 impeded	 when	 institutions	 are	 in	 flux,	
because	such	processes	are	by	their	very	nature	“highly	contingent	and	potentially	shaped	
by	exogenous	and	sudden	events”	impacting	upon	individuals’	exposure	to	an	organization	
(Beyers,	2010:	917;	see	also	Hooghe,	2005).	This	takes	a	step	towards	addressing	the	limited	
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empirical	 research	 “on	 the	 contextual	 factors	 that	 facilitate	 and	 constrain	 socialization	
practices	 and	 outcomes”	 (Ashforth	 et	 al.,	 2007:	 31).6	 Second,	 intensified	 gender	 equality	
policies	in	many	IGOs	imply	that	women	are	set	to	make	up	a	larger	share	of	staff	in	coming	
years	(Ban,	2013),	which	raises	the	question	whether	gender	is	one	of	“the	characteristics	of	
individual	agents	(…)	[that]	retard	or	propel	the	socialization	process”	(Johnston,	2001:	506).	
Such	 differences	 between	 men	 and	 women	 can	 arise	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons,	 and	 we	
evaluate	whether	gender	affects	 individuals’	openness	to	changing	their	attitudes	towards	
those	of	 the	organization.	 Finally,	 our	 third	 scope	 condition	 relates	 to	age	at	 entry	 in	 the	
IGO,	which	 is	directly	 linked	 to	 the	oft-stated	 impact	of	previous	socialization	experiences	
(Hooghe,	 2005;	 Checkel,	 2005;	 Cohen,	 2017).	 Individuals’	 values	 are	 arguably	 most	
malleable	early	in	life,	such	that	entering	an	IGO	at	an	earlier	age	implies	fewer	“cognitive	
priors	that	might	block	a	socialization	message”	(Checkel,	2017:	597).	
	
Theoretical	framework	and	hypotheses	
In	the	early	functionalist	approach	to	international	organization,	experience	of	working	for	
an	IGO	was	believed	to	produce	a	“transfer	away	from	identification	with	national	units	and	
toward	the	adoption	of	an	internationalist	outlook”	(Wolf,	1973:	354).	A	similar	idea	is	also	
central	 to	 more	 recent	 constructivist	 scholarship	 in	 IR.	 This	 approach	 views	 IGOs	 as	
“triggers”	 of	 socialization	 mechanisms	 inducing	 individual	 actors	 to	 shift	 their	 allegiance	
toward	 the	 international	 level	 (Checkel,	 2005).	 Several	 causal	mechanisms	underlying	 this	
process	of	attitude	change	have	been	proposed,	including	strategic	calculation,	role	playing,	
normative	suasion,	mimicking,	and	so	on	(Checkel,	2005;	Johnston,	2005;	Zürn	and	Checkel,	
2005).7	 Though	 recognizing	 the	 importance	 of	 such	 mechanisms,	 we	 leave	 aside	 their	
investigation	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 more	 general	 expectation	 raised	 in	 both	 theoretical	
approaches	 that	 “the	 organizational	 setting	 might	 account	 for	 an	 individual	 actor’s	
																																																						
6	This	first	scope	condition	is	closely	linked	to	the	burgeoning	public	administration	literature	examining	how	
reform	 processes	 influence	 workforce	 motivation	 (e.g.,	 Franco	 et	 al.,	 2002)	 and	 employee’s	 normative	
commitment	to	the	organization	(Yang	and	Pandey,	2009).	While	reforms	are	often	shown	to	be	detrimental	
to	workforce	motivation	and	commitment	in	this	literature,	they	may	also	have	positive	effects	on	employee	
commitment	 if	 they	 improve	 goal	 clarity	 and	 undermine	 the	 routinization	 and	 centralization	 of	 work	
processes	(Yang	and	Pandey,	2009).	
7	Proposed	theoretical	mechanisms	most	often	rely	on	a	process	involving	either	arguing	(i.e.	changing	beliefs	
by	 reference	 to	valid	and	truthful	empirical	and	normative	statements)	or	bargaining	 (i.e.	changing	beliefs	
following	 credible	 threats	 and	 promises)	 (Zürn	 and	 Checkel,	 2005;	 Johnston,	 2001,	 2005).	Much	 of	 these	
discussions	 are	 conducted	 at	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 abstraction,	 and	 lack	 elaboration	 of	 clear	 empirical	
counterparts.	
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allegiance	 and	 preference	 formation”	 (Zürn	 and	 Checkel,	 2005:	 1054).	 The	 baseline	
hypothesis	thus	is	that	individual-level	attitude	change	via	a	process	of	socialization	occurs	
in	IGOs.	
	 	
	 H1:	Experience	in	IGOs	leads	civil	servants	to	develop	internationalist	attitudes.	
	
An	 important	 tacit	 assumption	 in	 the	 foregoing	 literature	 is	 that	 attitude	 change	 occurs	
progressively	 over	 time.	 Most	 previous	 work	 takes	 length	 of	 service	 as	 the	 main	
independent	variable	(Wolf,	1973;	Beyers,	2005,	2010;	Hooghe,	2005),	with	the	implication	
that	each	additional	year	within	the	IGO	has	a	similar	effect	on	attitude	change.	Of	course,	
this	assumption	requires	“a	more	or	less	stable	set	of	forces	that	steadily	push	and	pull	on	
[staff	members]”	–	which	is	implausible	in	most	real-word	settings	(Ashforth	et	al.,	2007:	6).	
Nonetheless,	 as	 acknowledged	 across	 disciplinary	 boundaries,	 organizational	 socialization	
processes	 require	 that	 individuals’	 involvement	within	 a	 given	 environment	 is	 continuous	
and	consistent	over	time	(Cook,	1985;	Saks	and	Ashforth,	1997;	Beyers,	2010).	
	
This	requirement	of	temporal	consistency	implies	that	an	individual’s	socialization	depends	
on	 the	 absence	 of	 disruptive	 events	 on	 their	 experience	 within	 the	 organization.	 Such	
changes	 in	 the	 contextual	 setting,	 which	 might	 include	 structural	 reorganizations	 due	 to	
divisional	mergers	or	separations,	or	changes	 in	 leadership,	could	 impede	the	socialization	
process	and	 lead	 to	“socialization	 turning	points”	 (Bullis	and	Bach,	1989:	273;	Ashforth	et	
al.,	 2007:	 6).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 changes	 in	 organizational	 context	 create	 heightened	
uncertainty	 and	 stress	 even	 when	 staff	 retain	 the	 same	 job,	 office,	 and	 immediate	
colleagues	 (Kavanagh	 and	 Ashkanasy,	 2006;	 Bellou,	 2007;	 de	 Jong	 et	 al.,	 2016).	
Organizational	 changes	 are	 often	 also	 perceived	by	 staff	 as	 a	 breach	of	 the	 psychological	
contract	 between	 employers	 and	 employees	 (Burke	 and	 Leiter,	 2000;	 Bellou,	 2007).	 The	
extensive	 literatures	 on	psychological	 contract	 violations	 and	unmet	 expectations	 suggest	
that	“unpleasant	surprises”	of	this	sort	can	easily	“turn	one	against	the	job,	sub-unit,	and/or	
organization”	(Ashforth	et	al.,	2007:	46;	Burke	and	Leiter,	2000).		
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 organizational	 changes	 affect	 social	 interactions	 and	 relational	 ties	
between	 individuals.	 This	 is	 important	 because	 social	 networks	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 both	
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(neo)functionalist	 and	 constructivist	 accounts	 of	 socialization	 into	 organizational	 values	
(Wolf,	1973;	Zürn	and	Checkel,	2005).	If	social	ties	matter	for	attitude	change,	then	changes	
in	such	ties	will	also	matter.	The	effect	might	be	even	more	powerful	in	organizations	–	such	
as	 the	European	Commission	–	where	there	are	 low	 levels	of	horizontal	mobility	between	
departments	 (Kassim	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Connolly	 and	 Kassim,	 2015).	 In	 such	 settings,	
organizational	 change	 disrupts	 established	 networks.	 In	 summary,	 organizational	 changes	
that	 suspend	 the	 temporal	 consistency	 of	 an	 individual’s	 (work)	 environment	 can	 be	
expected	 to	 interrupt	 –	 or	 even	 disrupt	 and	 reverse	 –	 any	 ongoing	 process	 of	 attitude	
change.	This	line	of	argument	shapes	our	second	hypothesis.	It	implies	also	that	exogenous	
shocks	in	the	form	of	organizational	changes	can	help	in	identifying	socialization	processes	–	
a	point	to	which	we	return	in	the	discussion	of	our	empirical	strategy.	
	
H2:	 The	 socialization	 of	 individuals	 into	 international	 attitudes	 is	 disrupted	 –	 and	
possibly	reversed	–	when	they	experience	organizational	change.8	
	
It	 is	 important,	however,	 to	distinguish	between	unexpected	and	expected	change.	 In	 the	
organizational	 socialization	 literature,	 one	 of	 the	 prime	 inhibiting	 conditions	 for	 the	
socialization	 process	 is	 unexpected	 and	 unpredictable	 change	 (Ashforth	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 In	
other	 words,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 interruptions	 in	 the	 socialization	 process	 linked	 to	
organizational	 change	 are	 driven	 by	 uncertainty,	 stress	 and	 perceptions	 of	 psychological	
contract	 breach,	 increasing	 the	 predictability	 of	 –	 and/or	 information	 about	 –	 impending	
reorganizations	 should	 work	 to	 reduce	 such	 negative	 implications.	 This	 argument	 is	 also	
consistent	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 surprises	 are	 particularly	 likely	 to	 prompt	 sense-making	
activities	–	i.e.	a	thinking	process	in	which	individuals	interpret	and	impute	meaning	to	their	
surroundings	 via	 the	 alteration	 of	 available	 cognitive	 scripts	 (Louis,	 1980).	 In	 our	 setting,	
such	sense-making	activities	can	be	expected	to	induce	a	readjustment	of	staff	expectations	
regarding	their	organization	and	of	their	position	towards	its	norms	and	values.	Hypothesis	
H2	can	be	reformulated	as	follows	to	capture	this	more	detailed	specification:	
	
																																																						
8	This	 is	not	to	say	that	 individuals	experiencing	profound	changes	in	their	 lives	are	not	open	to	socialization	
processes.	They	most	definitely	are.	Yet,	clearly,	the	deeply	social	and	group-based	process	of	socialization	
will	almost	by	definition	be	sensitive	to	surprises	in	individuals’	social	environment.	
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H3:	 The	 socialization	 of	 individuals	 into	 international	 attitudes	 is	 disrupted	 –	 and	
possibly	reversed	–	when	they	experience	unexpected	organizational	change.	
	
It	is	important,	however,	to	further	refine	the	scope	conditions	under	which	IGOs	are	most	
likely	 to	 trigger	 socialization	effects.	While	 length	and	 intensity	of	participation	as	well	 as	
the	strength	of	prior	(inter/nationalist)	attitudes	have	been	argued	to	affect	the	likelihood	
of	 attitude	 change	 (Louis,	 1980;	 Beyers,	 2005;	 Hooghe,	 2005),	 little	 is	 known	 “about	 the	
properties	of	the	actors	and	structures	that	trigger	socialization”	(Zürn	and	Checkel,	2005:	
1055;	see	also	Wolf,	1973;	Johnston,	2005;	Ashforth	et	al.,	2007).	Building	on	insights	from	
previous	 socialization	 research	 in	 other	 organizational	 settings	 as	 well	 as	 broader	 social-
psychological	research,	we	argue	that	agents’	gender	and	age	at	entry	into	the	organization	
constitute	two	critical	scope	conditions.	
	
Starting	 with	 the	 former,	 there	 are	 two	 lines	 of	 argument	 suggesting	 gender-related	
differences	 in	 the	 socializing	 influence	 of	 international	 organization.	 First,	 social-
psychological	evidence	suggests	that	“relationships	are	more	central	to	females’	than	males’	
sense	 of	 self”,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 women	 “demonstrate	 more	 concern	 about	 social	
evaluation”	(Rudolph	and	Conley,	2005:	116).	This	can	have	important	implications	for	the	
way	women	and	men	respond	to	socialization,	which	 is	 fundamentally	a	group	process.	A	
tendency	 towards	 “socio-evaluative	 concerns”	 in	 women	 could	 make	 them	 “particularly	
attuned	to	their	interpersonal	environments”,	and	more	open	to	positive	as	well	as	negative	
socializing	influences	within	IGOs	(Rudolph	and	Conley,	2005:	119;	Draper,	1985;	Rose	and	
Rudolph,	2006).	Second,	despite	many	efforts	at	gender	equality	in	the	workplace,	women	
often	 still	 have	 to	 “overcome	 greater	 obstacles	 than	 men	 to	 achieve	 a	 given	 level	 of	
organizational	 success”	 (Lefkowitz,	 1994:	 344;	 Ragins	 and	 Sundstrom,	 1989).	 Hence,	 the	
investment	put	into	reaching	a	certain	position	tends	to	be	higher.	As	such	investments	are	
generally	unrecoverable,	women	can	be	expected	to	“value	their	membership	[in	any	given	
organization]	more	than	men”	(Aven	et	al.,	2003:	65).	This	may	again	increase	the	openness	
of	women	to	positive,	as	well	as	negative,	socializing	influences	in	IGOs.	
	
H4:	 Women	 respond	 more	 strongly	 to	 (unexpected)	 organizational	 changes	
interrupting	their	socialization	into	internationalist	attitudes.	
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Age	at	entry	into	an	IGO	matters	for	socialization	processes	because	“new	experiences	stick	
best	when	a	person	has	few	relevant	prior	experiences”	(Hooghe,	2005:	866;	Checkel,	2005,	
2017;	 Cohen,	 2017).	 Such	 “blank	 slates”	 have	 “few	 cognitive	 priors	 that	 might	 block	 a	
socialization	 message”,	 and	 should	 thus	 be	 more	 susceptible	 to	 socialization	 when	 they	
enter	 a	 new	 social	 setting	 (Checkel,	 2017:	 597;	 Johnston,	 2001;	 Hooghe,	 2005;	 Gheciu,	
2005).	 In	 contrast,	 the	 strong(er)	 cognitive	 priors	 of	 individuals	 with	 earlier	 relevant	
socialization	experiences	may	enhance	or	prolong	their	ability	to	resist	social	pressures	in	a	
new	 setting.	 Hence,	 one	 would	 expect	 faster	 and	 deeper	 socialization	 among	 individuals	
entering	as	blank	slates,	and	thus	also	more	persistent	values	and	attitudes	 in	 the	 face	of	
subsequent	 contextual	 shocks.	 For	 individuals	 entering	 an	 IGO	 at	 a	 later	 age,	 the	
socialization	process	might	rather	be	more	gradual	and	lead	to	less	deep	internalization	–	if	
it	 occurs	 at	 all.	 Such	 individuals	 may	 then	 also	 remain	 more	 responsive	 to	 (unexpected)	
organizational	 changes	 interrupting	 their	 socialization	 into	 internationalist	 attitudes.	 This	
leads	to	our	fifth	and	final	hypothesis:	
	
H5:	Individuals	entering	an	IGO	at	a	later	age	experience	a	more	gradual	socialization	
process,	 and	 remain	 more	 responsive	 to	 (unexpected)	 organizational	 changes	
interrupting	their	socialization	into	internationalist	attitudes.	
	
Empirical	analysis	
Case	selection		
Our	 empirical	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 the	 permanent,	 administrative	 (AD-level)	 staff	 of	 the	
European	 Commission.	 The	 reasons	 for	 this	 choice	 are	 practical	 and	 methodological.	 To	
start	 with	 the	 latter,	 the	 European	 institutions	 –	 and	 particularly	 the	 Commission	 –	 are	
among	the	most	institutionalized	organizations	in	the	world’s	most	advanced	supranational	
polity.	This	is	important	for	our	purpose	since	these	institutions	are	more	likely	than	other	
IOs	 to	 demonstrate	 an	 “ability	 to	 imbue	 (…)	 participants	 with	 organizational	 values”	
(Keohane,	1969:	861).	The	EU	can	thus	be	viewed	as	a	site	of	significant	socializing	potential	
(Hooghe,	2005;	Zürn	and	Checkel,	2005;	Suvarierol	et	al.,	2013;	Bes,	2017).	The	European	
Commission	also	has	a	strong	and	commonly	acknowledged	supranational	identity	(Hooghe,	
2005;	 Suvarierol	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 This	 is	 critical	 as	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 clear	 and	 coherent	
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identity	“the	socialization	effects	of	the	 institution	will	be	diluted,	or	 indeed	non-existent”	
(Johnston,	 2005:	 1020).	 Furthermore,	 the	 Commission	 spends	 considerable	 resources	 on	
influencing	staff	towards	its	supranational	mission.	Its	staff	regulations,	for	instance,	require	
that	“an	official	shall	carry	out	(…)	the	duties	assigned	to	him	objectively,	impartially	and	in	
keeping	with	 his	 duty	 of	 loyalty	 to	 the	 Communities”	 (European	 Communities,	 2004:	 Art.	
11).	This	strengthens	any	potential	for	attitude	change	since	such	processes	become	more	
likely	“the	more	rigorously	an	organization	attempts	 to	 influence	 its	members”	 (Chatman,	
1991:	462).	
	
From	a	practical	standpoint,	the	European	Commission	went	through	a	number	of	structural	
and	 leadership	 changes	 in	 the	period	2009-2014,	which	 is	highly	 significant	 in	 the	 light	of	
hypotheses	H2	 and	H3.	 It	 currently	 consists	 of	 28	Directorates-General	 (DGs)	 alongside	 a	
number	of	executive	Offices	(e.g.,	European	Anti-Fraud	Office,	and	Publications	Office)	and	
Agencies	 (e.g.,	 Internal	 Audit	 Service,	 and	 Legal	 Service).	 Five	 of	 these	 DGs	 underwent	
substantial	 restructuring	 in	 2010-2011.	 Three	were	 divided	 into	 smaller,	more	 specialized	
DGs.	 Thus,	 energy	 and	 transport	 competencies	 were	 reorganized	 into	 separate	 DGs	 (DG	
ENER	and	DG	MOVE),	a	new	DG	Climate	Action	was	created	separate	from	DG	Environment,	
and	 the	DG	dealing	with	 internal	affairs	and	 justice	competencies	was	divided	 into	 two:	a	
DG	focused	on	migration	and	home	affairs	(DG	HOME)	and	a	DG	responsible	for	justice	and	
consumers	 (DG	 JUST).	 Several	 DGs	 were	 also	 affected	 by	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 European	
External	 Action	 Service	 in	 2010.	 As	 part	 of	 the	 reorganization,	 all	 remaining	 Commission	
competencies	 in	 international	 cooperation	 and	 development	 were	 brought	 together	 into	
one	 new	 DG	 (DG	 DEVCO).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 DGs	 for	 neighborhood	 policy	 and	
enlargement	issues	were	combined	into	the	new	DG	ELARG	(now	DG	NEAR).	An	overview	of	
structural	 changes	 over	 the	 period	 under	 analysis	 is	 included	 in	 the	 supplementary	
appendix.	
	
In	light	of	hypothesis	H3,	it	should	be	noted	that	structural	changes	within	the	Commission	
are	 initiated	 and	 engineered	 by	 the	 Commission’s	 political	 leadership.	 They	 are	 imposed	
from	above	without	much	opportunity	for	staff	in	the	affected	departments	to	provide	input	
into	 the	 process	 (Commission	 staff	 member,	 personal	 communication,	 May	 2016).	 The	
splitting	up	of	the	three	departments	outlined	above	were	viewed	by	many	in	the	affected	
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DGs	 as	 hostile	 separations	 (Commission	HR	 staff	member,	 personal	 communication,	 June	
2016).	As	 such,	 they	 can	be	 viewed	as	exogenous	and	 largely	unpredictable	 interventions	
from	 the	 perspective	 of	most	 AD-level	 Commission	 staff	 –	 except,	 possibly,	 those	 in	 top	
leadership	positions.9	
	
Leadership	 changes	 in	 the	Commission	 take	 two	main	 forms:	 political	 and	 administrative.	
While	the	former	are	linked	to	Commissioners’	fixed	term	of	office,	the	principle	of	rotating	
senior	 managerial	 staff	 (including	 Directors-General)	 was	 introduced	 in	 March	 2000	
following	 the	downfall	of	 the	Santer	Commission	 (Schön-Quinlivan,	2011).	Although	 these	
leadership	 changes	 involve	 a	 regular	 internal	 rotation	 of	 managerial	 staff,	 they	 do	 not	
always	 occur	 simultaneously	 in	 various	 parts	 of	 the	 Commission	 –	 a	 fact	 that	 can	 be	
exploited	for	identification	purposes	in	our	analysis	(more	details	below).10	Moreover,	since	
these	leadership	changes	have	been	written	into	Commission	rules,	they	have	a	high	degree	
of	predictability	–	which	is	important	from	the	perspective	of	hypothesis	H3.	Still,	it	should	
be	 noted	 that	 leadership	 changes	 higher	 up	 the	 Commission	 hierarchy	 affect	 the	 style	 of	
management,	but	do	not	necessarily	disrupt	routine	ways	of	working.	For	an	overwhelming	
majority	of	staff,	the	most	important	person	in	setting	the	tone	of	the	working	environment	
is	the	Head	of	Unit	–	a	middle	management	position.	Hence,	the	leadership	changes	under	
analysis	affect	the	organizational	context	rather	than	the	 immediate	working	environment	
of	staff.	A	complete	overview	of	all	relevant	leadership	changes	in	the	period	2009-2014	is	
again	included	in	the	supplementary	appendix.		
	
Dataset	and	dependent	variable	
Our	dataset	combines	two	main	sources	of	 information.	First,	we	collected	information	on	
all	 substantive	organizational	 changes	 in	 the	Commission	over	 the	period	2009-2014.	This	
																																																						
9	Murdoch	 (2012)	 cites	 several	 sources	 indicating	 that	 even	 the	 leadership	of	Commission	DGs	 immediately	
affected	by	the	construction	of	the	EEAS	failed	to	have	much	involvement	and	influence	in	this	process.	
10	 Since	 all	 Commissioners	 were	 replaced	 with	 the	 change	 from	 Barroso	 I	 to	 Barroso	 II	 in	 2009,	 this	 shift	
affected	all	Commission	employees	at	the	same	time	and	to	the	same	extent.	Hence,	it	does	not	affect	our	
ability	 to	 obtain	 valid	 inferences	 on	 the	 remaining	 structural	 and	 leadership	 changes	 (since	 we	 rely	 on	
differences	 in	 developments	 among	 groups	 of	 staff	members	 over	 time;	more	 details	 below).	 Any	 effects	
observed	below	thus	arise	independent	of	this	Commission	replacement.	A	similar	argument	holds	for	other	
developments	that	could	have	affected	all	staff	members	equally	over	the	period	under	analysis	(such	as,	for	
instance,	the	onset	of	the	financial	crisis,	changes	in	staff	regulations,	or	any	learning	experiences	regarding	
the	efficiency	or	legitimacy	of	supranationalism	as	such).	
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was	assembled	 from	official	 Commission	documents,	press	 releases,	 and	media	 coverage,	
and	provided	data	on	the	nature	of	each	reorganization,	as	well	as	its	timing.	Information	on	
leadership	changes	was	compiled	from	the	official	directories	of	the	European	Union	for	the	
years	2008	to	2014,	Commission	press	releases	about	new	appointments,	as	well	as	publicly	
available	CVs	of	senior	Commission	staff.	We	collected	the	name,	gender	and	nationality	of	
every	Commissioner	and	Director-General	(or	Directors	in	the	case	of	executive	Offices	and	
Agencies),	 along	with	 information	 about	 their	 exact	 period	 in	 office.	 This	 first	 set	 of	 data	
allows	us	to	specify	several	key	independent	variables	in	our	analysis	(i.e.	organizational	and	
leadership	changes).	
	
Second,	 information	 on	 Commission	 officials’	 background	 characteristics	 and	
internationalist	attitudes	was	collected	from	two	 large-scale	surveys	conducted	within	the	
European	 Commission	 in	 September-November	 2008	 (N=1901;	 response	 rate=13.6%)	 and	
March-April	 2014	 (N=2209;	 response	 rate=20.8%).11	 Both	 of	 the	 retrieved	 samples	 are	
representative	of	the	AD-level	staff	of	the	Commission	along	key	dimensions	(Kassim	et	al.,	
2013).	Since	stringent	anonymity	requirements	were	imposed	on	the	survey	design	and	no	
individual	 identifiers	 are	 available,	 the	 data	 from	 the	 surveys	 do	 not	 constitute	 a	 panel	
dataset.	We	 can	 nonetheless	 exploit	 the	 longitudinal	 dimension	 of	 the	 data	 by	matching	
individuals	 with	 the	 same	 socio-demographic	 background	 characteristics	 in	 both	 surveys.	
We	use	Stata’s	“duplicates”	command	to	generate	this	panel,	and	find	a	perfect	match	for	
165	respondents	or	approximately	9%	of	the	sample	covered	 in	the	first	survey	wave.	We	
define	 a	 perfect	 match	 as	 someone	 with	 the	 same	 age,	 gender,	 nationality	 (in	 terms	 of	
primary	nationality	and	presence/absence	of	a	second	nationality)	and	education	(in	terms	
of	level,	field	and	international	study	experience),	working	in	the	same	Directorate-General,	
who	also	reports	having	entered	the	Commission	in	the	same	year	in	both	surveys.12	Given	
this	range	of	background	characteristics,	we	can	have	high	confidence	that	we	are	capturing	
																																																						
11	 While	 the	 first	 survey	 was	 limited	 to	 permanent	 administrative	 (AD-level)	 staff,	 the	 second	 survey	 was	
circulated	 to	 every	 employee	 in	 all	 staff	 categories.	 As	 our	 analysis	 is	 restricted	 to	AD	 staff,	 the	 response	
rates	are	expressed	as	a	percentage	of	ADs	in	both	cases.	Response	rates	are	mitigated	by	the	high	workload	
of	our	target	population.	
12	We	exclude	individuals	moving	to	another	Directorate-General	between	both	survey	waves	for	two	reasons.	
First,	 such	moves	may	be	a	choice	by	 the	staff	member,	which	 introduces	self-selection	concerns.	Second,	
from	 a	 practical	 perspective,	 it	 becomes	 more	 difficult	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 it	 really	 concerns	 the	 same	
individual	in	both	survey	rounds.	
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the	same	respondent	in	both	datasets.	This	is	confirmed	by	the	fact	that	we	never	find	more	
than	 one	 perfect	match	 for	 any	 given	 individual.13	 In	 a	 robustness	 check,	we	 allowed	 for	
small	 deviations	 in	 respondents’	 answers	 to	 at	 most	 one	 of	 the	matching	 characteristics	
(excluding	 basic	 demographics	 such	 as	 age,	 gender,	 nationality,	 and	 education	 field).	 This	
accounts	for	the	possibility	that	some	respondents	might	“misremember”	their	starting	year	
in	the	Commission	or	how	long	they	studied	abroad,	as	well	as	for	mismatches	induced	by	
the	answer	categories	provided	in	the	survey.	Such	“near-perfect”	matches	occur	for	up	to	
48	additional	respondents,	and	all	findings	reported	below	remain	qualitatively	unchanged	
when	using	this	extended	sample	(although	they	become	less	precise	due	to	the	increased	
“noise”	in	the	matching	process	–	full	details	in	appendix	A).	
	
The	two	surveys	took	a	similar	approach	and	five	of	the	seven	researchers	who	undertook	
the	first	study,	including	the	PI,	also	conducted	the	second.	Both	covered	a	significant	range	
of	socio-demographic	characteristics	(which	are	critical	for	generating	the	matches	between	
both	 samples;	 see	 above),	 as	 well	 as	 questions	 regarding	 Commission	 officials’	
internationalist	attitudes	–	our	main	dependent	variable.	To	operationalize	this	dependent	
variable,	 we	 rely	 on	 two	 statements	 about	 where	 power	 should	 reside	 in	 the	 European	
Union:	 i)	 “The	College	of	Commissioners	should	become	the	government	of	 the	European	
Union”,	and	ii)	“The	member	states	–	not	the	Commission	or	European	Parliament	–	should	
be	 the	 central	 players	 in	 the	 European	Union”.	 Responses	were	 recorded	 on	 a	 five-point	
scale	from	(1)	“strongly	agree”	to	(5)	“strongly	disagree”.	We	reverse	the	coding	for	the	first	
proposition	 to	 obtain	 a	 scale	 where	 higher	 numbers	 reflect	 officials’	 support	 for	 an	
internationalist	 rather	 than	 a	 national	 power	 orientation	 in	 the	 European	 Union,	 and	
average	 every	 respondent’s	 answer	 on	 both	 propositions	 throughout	 the	 analysis	
(henceforth	 referred	 to	as	 the	variable	 “Commission	 role	 in	Europe”).	 Similar	measures	of	
Commission	officials’	internationalist	attitudes	have	been	extensively	employed	in	previous	
studies	 (Hooghe,	 2003,	 2005,	 2012;	 Schafer,	 2014;	 Bes,	 2017).	 Given	 the	 European	
Commission’s	 strong	 supra-national	 identity,	 a	 change	 over	 time	 in	 such	 internationalist	
																																																						
13	Note	that	we	are	not	matching	an	individual	respondent	in	2008	to	other	sufficiently	similar	individual(s)	in	
2014.	By	imposing	perfect	overlap	in	a	broad	set	of	characteristics,	we	effectively	link	individuals	in	2008	to	
themselves	in	2014	–	thus	creating	a	panel	dataset.	Using	terminology	from	matching	analysis,	our	approach	
imposes	 that	 the	 ‘propensity	 score’	 accounting	 for	 all	 background	 characteristics	 equals	 1	 for	 each	of	 our	
perfect	matches.	
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attitudes	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 reflecting	 the	 result	 of	 a	 socialization	 process	 where	 “actors	
adopt	the	norms	and	rules	of	a	given	community”	(Checkel,	2017:	592;	Cohen,	2017).	
	
Summary	statistics	for	the	dependent	variable	as	well	as	a	set	of	background	characteristics	
are	 provided	 in	 Table	 1	 of	 the	 supplementary	 appendix.	 This	 indicates	 that	 the	matched	
respondent	sample	shows	an	under-representation	of	cabinet	members	(3.5%	versus	0.6%;	
p<0.05),	which	 reflects	 that	 cabinet	members	 tend	 to	 change	with	 the	 appointment	 of	 a	
new	 Commissioner.	 The	matched	 sample	 is	 also	 somewhat	more	 likely	 to	 be	male	 (76%	
versus	67%;	p<0.05),	and	to	work	in	DGs	witnessing	structural	changes	in	the	period	under	
analysis	(26%	versus	17%;	p<0.01).	No	significant	differences	are	observed	between	the	two	
groups	 in	 terms	 of	 year	 of	 birth	 (on	 average	 1964),	 time	 of	 entry	 in	 the	 Commission	 (on	
average	 1997),	 age	 at	 entry	 (on	 average	 33),	 educational	 background,	 country	 of	 origin,	
Directorate-General,	 reason	 for	 joining	 the	Commission,	 and	pre-Commission	 career.	 (The	
last	four	comparisons	are	not	reported	in	Table	1,	but	are	available	upon	request).	Crucially,	
the	 same	 holds	 for	 our	 dependent	 variable,	 which	 is	 important	 to	 assuage	 potential	
concerns	over	sample	selection.	Overall,	the	matched	sample	is	representative	of	our	target	
population,	including	internationalist	attitudes	at	the	initial	point	of	measurement.	
	
Before	 turning	 to	 the	 empirical	 approach	 and	 results,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recall	 that	 the	
second	survey	was	fielded	just	under	six	years	after	the	first	(and	less	than	three	years	after	
the	 structural	 changes	 under	 analysis).	 Although	 socialization	 theories	 fail	 to	 specify	 the	
time	 interval	within	which	 to	expect	attitudinal	 changes,	 socialization	processes	are	often	
characterized	by	rapid	initial	change	–	particularly	if	the	process	is	intensely	experienced	–
followed	by	a	consolidation	period	of	relative	stability	(Saks	and	Ashforth,	1997;	Ashforth	et	
al.,	2007;	Cohen,	2017).	Our	two	time-points	could	therefore	be	viewed	as	two	punctuated	
equilibria	in	individual-level	attitudes.	Even	so,	one	might	debate	the	usefulness	of	surveys	
to	study	socialization,	rather	than	qualitative	methods	including	interviews,	life	histories	and	
ethnographic	 studies	 (Cook,	1985;	Sigel,	1995).	We	strongly	believe	 that	 repeated	 surveys	
can	capture	changes	in	individuals’	values	and	beliefs,	and	thus	are	informative	for	analysing	
the	observable	 implications	of	 socialization	processes	where	 ‘actors	 adopt	 the	norms	and	
rules	 of	 a	 given	 community’	 (see	 above).	 Evidently,	 surveys	 are	 less	 able	 to	 reveal	 the	
endpoint	of	socialization,	which	is	the	internalization	of	new	attitudes	and	values.	As	such,	
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our	results	arguably	relate	more	to	what	Checkel	(2017:	597)	refers	to	as	Type	I	socialization	
–	where	 individuals’	 “beliefs	 (…)	 do	not	 replace	 earlier	 values,	 but	 are	 ‘superimposed’	 on	
them;	they	are	entirely	dependent	on	continuing	membership	 in	the	group”	–	rather	than	
Type	 II	 socialization	 where	 full	 internalization	 takes	 place.	 Given	 the	 technical,	
methodological	 and	 ethical	 obstacles	 to	 direct	 real-time	 observation	 of	 value	 acquisition,	
this	effectively	holds	for	most	socialization	research	to	date.	
	
Empirical	approach	
Our	analysis	 proceeds	 in	 two	 stages.	 First,	we	perform	difference-in-means	 t-tests	on	 the	
average	 position	 of	 Commission	 officials’	 internationalist	 attitudes	 among	 individuals	
with/without	 exposure	 to	 organizational	 changes	 before/after	 these	 changes	 took	 place.	
The	null	hypothesis	 is	that	(shifts	 in)	attitudes	across	both	groups	are	the	same,	while	the	
alternative	hypothesis	 is	 that	 there	exists	 a	 significant	difference.	 Still,	average	 responses	
within	particular	groups	of	respondents	arguably	fail	to	account	for	potential	(un)observed	
heterogeneity	across	respondents	that	might	affect	their	answers	within	and	across	survey	
waves.	Hence,	 in	the	second	stage	of	our	analysis,	we	estimate	a	difference-in-differences	
regression	model	with	individual-level	fixed	effects.	With	subscript	i	representing	individual	
respondents	and	subscript	t	designating	time,	this	can	be	written	as:	
	 𝑌!" =  𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2014! + 𝛽! 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒! + 𝛽! 𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2014! ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒! + 𝜀!"	 (1)	
	
Our	 dependent	 variable	 (𝑌!")	 measures	 Commission	 officials’	 internationalist	 attitudes,	
whereas	 the	set	of	 independent	variables	 includes	 two	 indicator	variables	as	well	as	 their	
interaction.	The	first	indicator	variable	(𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2014!)	is	1	for	responses	in	the	2014	wave	of	
the	survey	(0	for	responses	 in	the	2008	wave).	The	second	 indicator	variable	(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!)	 is	
equal	 to	 1	 for	 individuals	 that	 experience	 a	 structural	 or	 leadership	 change	 in	 the	 period	
between	 both	 survey	 waves	 (0	 otherwise).	 The	 interaction	 between	 both	 dummies	 (i.e.	𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2014! ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!)	 is	 our	 key	 variable	 of	 interest.	 It	 captures	 whether	 individuals	
experiencing	 a	 structural	 or	 leadership	 change	 develop	 differently	 between	 the	 first	 and	
second	wave	of	the	survey	compared	to	individuals	experiencing	no	structural	or	leadership	
change.	In	light	of	hypothesis	H2,	we	expect	𝛽!	<	0.	Since	a	statistically	significant	estimate	
of	𝛽!	 would	 indicate	 that	 at	 least	 some	 Commission	 officials	 adjust	 their	 internationalist	
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attitudes	over	time,	it	also	provides	evidence	in	favor	of	hypothesis	H1.	We	treat	structural	
and	 leadership	 changes	 separately	 throughout	 the	 analysis	 (and	 thus	 have	 two	 distinct	
Change	 variables)	 to	 assess	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	 effects	 of	 “unpredictable”	 structural	
reorganizations	 compared	 to	 “predictable”	 leadership	 rotations	 (hypothesis	 H3).	We	 also	
perform	separate	analyses	 for	women	and	men	as	well	as	 those	entering	the	Commission	
before/after	age	30	to	test	hypotheses	H4	and	H5.	
	
Equation	 (1)	 includes	 a	 full	 set	 of	 respondent	 fixed	 effects	 (𝛼!),	 which	 capture	 all	 time-
invariant	 differences	 across	 respondents	 (for	 instance,	 related	 to	 their	 gender,	 start	 of	
service	 in	 the	 IGO,	 strength	of	 prior	 nationalist	 and	 internationalist	 attitudes,	 and	 so	on).	
This	allows	us	 to	control	 for	a	 range	of	observed	and	unobserved	elements	characterizing	
individual	respondents,	and	implies	that	we	derive	our	inferences	exclusively	from	variation	
over	 time	within	a	given	 respondent.	 Since	 these	 fixed	effects	are	perfectly	 collinear	with	𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒! 	–	which	represents	an	 individual-level	characteristic	of	respondents	experiencing	
(or	not)	 a	 structural	or	 leadership	 change	–	 this	 variable	drops	out	of	 the	 final	 regression	
model.	 We	 cluster	 standard	 errors	 at	 the	 level	 of	 our	 observations	 (i.e.	 individual	
respondents)	to	avoid	biased	inferences	on	the	variables	of	interest	(Bertrand	et	al.,	2004).	
	
Results	
Organizational	change	and	internationalist	attitudes	
To	get	an	initial	sense	of	the	amount	of	attitude	change	in	the	dataset,	figure	1	presents	the	
distribution	of	changes	in	internationalist	attitudes	between	both	survey	waves	–	defined	as	
individual	 i’s	 internationalist	attitude	 in	2014	minus	 that	 in	2008.	A	 first	observation	 from	
figure	 1	 is	 that	 attitude	 changes	 for	 most	 respondents	 tend	 to	 be	 small.	 Given	 that	 the	
average	respondent	 in	our	sample	had	served	 in	the	Commission	for	more	than	ten	years	
(see	Table	1),	this	is	not	unexpected.	A	second	observation	concerns	the	slight	skew	in	the	
distribution	towards	positive	numbers.	Although	this	is	consistent	with	socialization	towards	
more	internationalist	attitudes	over	time	(hypothesis	H1),	the	tendency	is	very	weak.	
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Figure	1:	Internationalist	attitudes	among	Commission	staff	
	
Note:	The	histogram	depicts	the	change	in	respondents’	internationalist	attitudes	between	both	surveys	using	
our	panel	of	perfectly	matched	individuals	(N=165).	
	
	
Figure	 2	 assesses	 hypotheses	H2	 and	H3	 by	 depicting	 changes	 in	 the	average	 position	 of	
Commission	officials’	internationalist	orientation	depending	on	whether	or	not	respondents	
witnessed	a	structural	or	leadership	change	in	their	workplace	between	both	survey	waves.	
On	 the	 left-hand	 side,	we	 present	 the	mean	 response	 during	 the	 2008	 survey	 (dark-grey	
bars)	and	the	2014	survey	(light-grey	bars)	among	respondents	in	DGs	without	and	with	an	
organizational	 change	between	2008	and	2014.	On	 the	 right-hand	 side,	 the	dark-grey	bar	
reflects	 the	 average	 change	 between	 both	 survey	 rounds	 among	 respondents	 in	 DGs	
without	 an	 organizational	 change,	 while	 the	 light-grey	 bar	 reflects	 the	 average	 change	
among	respondents	in	DGs	with	an	organizational	change.	The	top	panel	studies	the	effect	
of	exogenously	 imposed	unpredictable	structural	 changes	 in	 the	Commission	whereas	 the	
bottom	panel	evaluates	the	role	of	more	predictable	leadership	rotations.	
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Figure	2:	Change	in	preferences	about	role	of	the	Commission	in	Europe	
PANEL	I:	Structural	changes	
	
PANEL	II:	Leadership	changes	
	
Note:	 The	 figure	 presents	 changes	 between	 both	 survey	waves	 in	 respondents’	 views	 about	 the	 College	 of	
Commissioners	–	rather	than	the	Member	States	or	European	Parliament	–	being	the	key	player	in	the	
EU.	Answers	are	recorded	on	a	scale	from	1	(“Strongly	agree”)	to	5	(“Strongly	disagree”).	On	the	left-
hand	side,	we	present	the	mean	response	during	the	2008	survey	(dark-grey	bars)	and	the	2014	survey	
(light-grey	bars)	among	respondents	in	DGs	without	and	with	an	organizational	change	between	2008	
and	2014.	On	the	right-hand	side,	the	dark-grey	bar	reflects	the	average	change	between	both	survey	
waves	among	respondents	in	DGs	without	an	organizational	change	between	2008	and	2014,	while	the	
light-grey	bar	reflects	the	average	change	among	respondents	in	DGs	with	an	organizational	change.	In	
all	cases,	t-values	derive	from	a	parametric	difference-in-means	t-test	between	both	groups	presented	
in	the	respective	panels.	
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As	 figure	 2	 illustrates,	 respondents	 with	 no	 structural	 or	 leadership	 changes	 in	 their	
Directorate-General,	 executive	 office,	 or	 agency	 develop	 towards	 a	 more	 positive	 view	
about	 the	 College	 of	 Commissioners	 –	 rather	 than	 the	 Member	 States	 or	 European	
Parliament	 –	 being	 the	 key	 player	 in	 the	 EU.	 This	 shift	 towards	 a	 more	 internationalist	
position	is	much	weaker	for	respondents	who	do	witness	a	leadership	change,	and	is	even	
reversed	for	respondents	subjected	to	a	structural	change	between	both	survey	waves.	As	
might	be	expected,	all	changes	observed	on	the	left-hand	side	of	figure	2	remain	fairly	small,	
and	 none	 of	 the	 observed	 shifts	 in	 average	 attitudes	 reaches	 statistical	 significance	 at	
conventional	levels	(as	illustrated	by	the	t-values	at	the	bottom	of	both	panels).		
	
Nonetheless,	and	crucially,	the	right-hand	side	of	figure	2	illustrates	that	the	average	change	
among	 respondents	 in	 DGs	 without	 a	 structural	 change	 is	 positive	 (0.161),	 while	 it	 is	
negative	 among	 respondents	 in	 DGs	 with	 a	 structural	 change	 (-0.163).	 The	 difference	
between	both	changes	is	statistically	significant	at	the	95%	confidence	level.	Moreover,	the	
effect	 size	of	0.324	 is	 substantively	meaningful,	 since	 it	 reflects	approximately	35%	of	 the	
standard	deviation	of	attitudinal	changes	in	the	sample	(0.906).	In	similar	vein,	the	average	
shift	toward	a	more	internationalist	orientation	is	much	weaker	for	respondents	in	DGs	with	
a	 leadership	 change	 (0.044)	 compared	 to	 those	 without	 a	 leadership	 change	 (0.144)	 –	
although	 this	 difference	 remains	 statistically	 insignificant.	 The	 latter	 observation	 is	 in	 line	
with	 hypothesis	 H3,	 which	 argues	 that	 socialization	 into	 internationalist	 attitudes	 is	
particularly	likely	to	be	disrupted	under	unexpected	changes.	Due	to	the	rotation	scheme	for	
managerial	 staff	 Commission	 staff	 are	 used	 to	 leadership	 changes,	 which	 mitigates	 the	
effect	of	such	changes	on	staff	socialization	processes.	
	 	
Taking	the	two	results	together	provides	substantial	supportive	evidence	for	the	notion	that	
socialization	in	IGOs	is	conditional	upon	the	absence	of	organizational	changes	(hypothesis	
H2).	 Such	 disruptive	 events	 have	 an	 important	 impact	 upon	 the	 nature	 or	 intensity	 of	
individuals’	 exposure	 to	organizational	 values,	particularly	when	 they	are	unexpected	and	
unpredictable.	In	the	latter	case,	the	process	of	socialization	is	disrupted	and	development	
towards	 internationalist	 values	 can	 come	 to	 a	 halt	 –	 and	 might	 even	 go	 into	 reverse	
(hypothesis	H3).	
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Gender	and	age	at	entry	as	scope	conditions	
Figure	3	provides	a	separate	analysis	for	female	(left-hand	side)	and	male	(right-hand	side)	
Commission	officials.	Figure	4	does	the	same	for	people	entering	the	Commission	at	age	30	
or	younger	(left-hand	side)	or	after	age	30	(right-hand	side),	which	we	refer	to	as	‘novices’	
and	 ‘established’	 at	 the	 time	 of	 entry,	 respectively.14	 We	 focus	 on	 how	 the	 change	 in	
respondents’	internationalist	attitudes	differs	depending	on	whether	or	not	they	witnessed	
a	 structural	 or	 leadership	 change	 in	 their	 workplace	 between	 both	 survey	 waves	 (i.e.	
analysis	on	the	right-hand	side	of	figure	2).	
	
Several	 observations	 stand	 out	 in	 figures	 3	 and	 4.	 First,	 women	 and	 men	 as	 well	 as	
individuals	entering	before/after	age	30	show	only	marginal	differences	in	attitude	change	
between	both	surveys	when	they	are	not	subject	to	organizational	changes	(the	dark	grey	
bars).	 Second,	 and	more	 importantly,	 the	 average	 attitudinal	 change	 among	women	 and	
those	 entering	 after	 age	 30	 in	DGs	without	 a	 structural	 change	 is	 positive	 (i.e.	 0.229	 and	
0.178,	 respectively),	 while	 it	 is	 negative	 for	 these	 same	 groups	 in	 DGs	with	 a	 structural	
change	(i.e.	–0.393	and	–0.231,	respectively).	The	difference	between	both	attitudinal	shifts	
is	statistically	significant	at	the	95%	confidence	level.	While	similar	movements	are	observed	
for	 men	 and	 those	 entering	 at	 age	 30	 or	 younger,	 these	 changes	 are	 smaller	 and	 not	
statistically	significant.	The	bottom	panels	of	figures	3	and	4	provide	a	very	similar	picture,	
but,	 as	 before,	 the	 effects	 of	 leadership	 changes	 are	 always	 substantively	 weak	 and	
statistically	insignificant.	
	 	
																																																						
14	 This	 cut-off	 is	 also	 imposed	 in	 Hooghe	 (2005).	 In	 total,	 59	 individuals	 in	 our	 panel	 of	 perfect	 matches	
(35.76%)	entered	the	Commission	at	age	30	or	younger,	which	is	exactly	equivalent	to	the	percentage	cited	
in	Hooghe	(2005)	for	all	top	employees	in	the	institution.	
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Figure	3:	The	mediating	effect	of	respondent	gender	
PANEL	I:	Structural	changes	
	
	
PANEL	II:	Leadership	changes	
	
Note:	 The	 figure	 presents	 changes	 between	 both	 survey	 waves	 in	 respondents’	 views	 about	 the	 College	 of	
Commissioners	–	rather	than	the	Member	States	or	European	Parliament	–	being	the	key	player	 in	the	EU.	
Answers	are	recorded	on	a	scale	from	1	(“Strongly	agree”)	to	5	(“Strongly	disagree”).	On	the	left-hand	side,	
we	present	 changes	documented	among	women	 in	 the	 sample,	while	 the	 right-hand	 side	 focuses	on	male	
respondents.	In	both	cases,	the	dark-grey	bar	reflects	the	average	change	between	both	survey	waves	among	
respondents	 in	 DGs	 without	 an	 organizational	 change	 between	 2008	 and	 2014,	 while	 the	 light-grey	 bar	
reflects	the	average	change	among	respondents	 in	DGs	with	an	organizational	change.	 In	all	cases,	t-values	
derive	from	a	parametric	difference-in-means	t-test	between	both	groups	presented	in	the	respective	panels.	 	
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Figure	4:	The	mediating	effect	of	respondent	age	at	entry	
PANEL	I:	Structural	changes	
	
PANEL	II:	Leadership	changes	
	
Note:	 The	 figure	 presents	 changes	 between	 both	 survey	waves	 in	 respondents’	 views	 about	 the	 College	 of	
Commissioners	–	rather	 than	the	Member	States	or	European	Parliament	–	being	the	key	player	 in	 the	
EU.	Answers	are	recorded	on	a	scale	from	1	(“Strongly	agree”)	to	5	(“Strongly	disagree”).	On	the	left-hand	
side,	we	present	changes	documented	among	novices	upon	entry	(i.e.	age	at	entry	30	or	younger),	while	
the	right-hand	side	focuses	on	established	staff	upon	entry	(i.e.	age	at	entry	over	30	years).	In	both	cases,	
the	dark-grey	bar	 reflects	 the	 average	 change	between	both	 survey	waves	 among	 respondents	 in	DGs	
without	an	organizational	change	between	2008	and	2014,	while	the	light-grey	bar	reflects	the	average	
change	 among	 respondents	 in	 DGs	with	 an	 organizational	 change.	 In	 all	 cases,	 t-values	 derive	 from	 a	
parametric	difference-in-means	t-test	between	both	groups	presented	in	the	respective	panels.	
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Overall,	 figures	 3	 and	 4	 show	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 structural	 changes	 on	 the	 observed	
outcomes	 of	 socialization	 processes	 in	 figure	 2	 are	 driven	 by	 female	 respondents	 and	
individuals	entering	the	Commission	after	age	30.	The	former	finding	is	consistent	with	the	
notion	 –	 advanced	 in	 hypothesis	 H4	 –	 that	 women’s	 higher	 socio-evaluative	 concerns	
increase	 their	 openness	 to	 positive	 and	 negative	 socializing	 influences	 within	 IGOs.	 The	
latter	 finding	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 idea	 that	 individuals	having	entered	 the	Commission	with	
fewer	cognitive	priors	tend	to	have	the	Commission’s	 internationalist	position	more	firmly	
ingrained	 (Hooghe,	 2005;	 Cohen,	 2017).	 These	 values	 thereby	 become	 less	 sensitive	 to	
subsequent	(unexpected)	organizational	changes	–	as	posited	in	Hypothesis	H5.	
	
Robustness	analysis:	Difference-in-differences	regression	estimates	
Our	analysis	thus	far	has	concentrated	on	comparisons	of	group	averages,	and	does	not	test	
for	potentially	(un)observed	heterogeneity	across	respondents.	Table	1	reports	results	from	
estimating	 a	 set	 of	 difference-in-differences	 regression	models	 with	 individual-level	 fixed	
effects,	which	explicitly	 focuses	on	within-respondent	 changes	 in	 attitudes	over	 time	 (see	
above).	Column	 (1)	 includes	all	 respondents	 in	 the	matched	sample,	whereas	columns	 (2)	
and	(3)	limit	the	sample	to	male	and	female	respondents,	respectively,	and	column	(4)	and	
(5)	limit	the	sample	to	individuals	entering	the	Commission	before/after	age	30.15	
	
The	results	in	table	1	confirm	those	in	the	previous	section.	Focusing	first	on	the	top	panel,	
we	find	that	staff	who	experience	a	structural	change	in	their	immediate	work	environment	
develop	less	towards	an	internationalist	orientation	between	both	survey	waves	compared	
to	 individuals	not	experiencing	a	structural	change.	Columns	 (2)	and	 (3)	highlight	 that	 this	
overall	effect	is	driven	by	the	women	in	the	sample,	whereas	column	(4)	and	(5)	confirm	the	
strong	mediating	 role	of	 individuals’	age	at	entry	 in	 the	 IGO.	The	bottom	panel	of	 table	1	
replicates	 this	 pattern	 in	 the	 results,	 but	 reiterates	 that	 none	 of	 the	 attitudinal	 shifts	
induced	 by	 leadership	 changes	 are	 statistically	 significant	 at	 conventional	 levels.	 On	 the	
whole,	 we	 thus	 again	 find	 that	 structural	 changes	 in	 the	 Commission	 have	 stronger	
implications	 for	 socialization	processes	 than	 leadership	 changes	 (hypothesis	H3),	 and	 that	
																																																						
15	Similar	results	are	obtained	when	we	add	a	three-way	interaction	between	𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒2014!,	𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!	and	the	
gender	or	novice/established	character	of	respondents	to	the	analysis	in	Column	(1)	(see	Tables	A.2	and	A.3	
in	the	supplementary	appendix).	
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such	 structural	 alterations	 in	 the	 organizational	 environment	 particularly	 disrupt	 the	
socialization	 of	 female	 officials	 (hypothesis	 H4)	 and	 those	 entering	 the	 Commission	 as	
established	staff	(hypothesis	H5).16	
	
Table	1:	Difference-in-differences	regression	results	
Variable	
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
All	 Men	 Women	 Age	at	entry	
30	or	less	
Age	at	entry	
over	30	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Structural	change	
(dummy)	
-	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Wave2014	
(dummy)	
0.161	*	
(1.88)	
0.143	
(1.57)	
0.229	
(1.00)	
0.128	
(0.76)	
0.178	*	
(1.82)	
Structural	change	*	Wave2014	 -0.324	**	(-2.21)	
-0.195	
(-1.18)	
-0.622	**	
(-1.96)	
-0.187	
(-0.75)	
-0.408	**	
(-2.22)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
N	 323	 245	 78	 115	 208	
R2	 0.033	 0.023	 0.083	 0.010	 0.004	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Leadership	change	
(dummy)	
-	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Wave2014	
(dummy)	
0.144	
(1.07)	
0.132	
(0.79)	
0.182	
(0.96)	
0.194	
(0.79)	
0.111	
(0.72)	
Leadership	change	*	Wave2014	 -0.100	(-0.63)	
-0.051	
(-0.27)	
-0.256	
(-0.86)	
-0.181	
(-0.63)	
-0.051	
(-0.28)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
N	 323	 245	 78	 115	 208	
R2	 0.009	 0.014	 0.013	 0.000	 0.002	
Note:	 The	 dependent	 variable	 –	 “Commission	 role	 in	 Europe”	 –	 represents	 respondents’	 views	 about	 the	
College	 of	 Commissioners	 –	 rather	 than	 the	Member	 States	 or	 European	 Parliament	 –	 being	 the	 key	
player	 in	 the	EU.	Answers	are	recorded	on	a	scale	 from	1	 (“Strongly	agree”)	 to	5	 (“Strongly	disagree”).	
“Structural	 change”	and	“Leadership	change”	are	 indicator	variables	equal	 to	1	 for	 respondents	 in	DGs	
with	a	structural	or	leadership	change,	respectively,	between	2008	and	2014	(0	otherwise).	“Wave2014”	
is	an	indicator	variable	equal	to	1	for	the	second	wave	of	the	survey	in	2014	(0	for	the	first	wave	in	2008).	
Column	(1)	includes	all	respondents	in	the	matched	sample,	whereas	columns	(2)	and	(3)	limit	the	sample	
to	 male	 and	 female	 respondents,	 respectively.	 Columns	 (4)	 and	 (5)	 limit	 the	 sample	 to	 respondents	
entering	 the	 Commission	 before/after	 age	 30,	 respectively.	 t-values	 based	 on	 heteroscedasticity-
consistent	standard	errors	between	brackets.	***	p<0.01;	**	p<0.05;	*	p<0.1.	
	
One	final	comment	is	necessary.	Our	matched	sample	is	somewhat	more	likely	to	be	male	
and	to	work	in	DGs	witnessing	structural	changes	in	the	period	under	analysis.	This	might	be	
driving	at	least	part	of	the	results	described	above	if	(female)	bureaucrats	unhappy	with	the	
(structural)	 reorganizations	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 complete	 the	 second	 wave	 of	 the	 survey	
																																																						
16	Based	on	suggestions	by	an	anonymous	referee,	we	also	experimented	with	(inter)national	education	as	an	
additional	conditioning	variable.	The	results	show	that	our	key	findings	appear	strongest	among	individuals	
with	 at	 least	 some	 international	 education	 experience	 (full	 details	 in	 table	 A.4	 in	 the	 supplementary	
appendix).	
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(after	having	been	randomly	selected	 into	 the	 first	wave).	 If	 so,	 this	would	 imply	 that	our	
results	 reflect	an	upper	bound	of	 the	hypothesized	socialization	effects	–	since	 individuals	
with	 less	 pronounced	 attitudinal	 shifts	 would	 be	 under-represented	 in	 our	 sample.	 We	
cannot	 exclude	 this	 possibility	 based	 on	 the	 data	 available,	 and	 future	 research	 needs	 to	
verify	 this	 result	 using	 repeated	 observations	 from	 a	 randomly	 selected	 sample	 of	 IGO	
staff.17	 Nevertheless,	 such	 selection	 issues	 mainly	 restrict	 the	 ability	 to	 generalize	 our	
findings	 to	 the	 Commission	 as	 a	 whole.	 They	 do	 not	 invalidate	 the	 conclusion	 that	
substantively	meaningful	attitudinal	changes	can	occur	in	IGOs	for	specific	staff	contingents	
(particularly	 women	 and	 those	 older	 at	 entry).	We	 view	 these	 observations	 as	 the	more	
critical	insights	from	our	analysis.	
	
Discussion 
The	six-year	period	between	the	two	surveys	is	not	long	enough	to	allow	us	to	assess	claims	
concerning	 the	causal	mechanisms	underlying	value	acquisition	made	by	neo-functionalist	
and	 constructivist	 scholars	 (Checkel,	 2005;	 Johnston,	 2005;	 Zürn	 and	Checkel,	 2005).	 	We	
are	 unable,	 for	 example,	 to	 test	 whether	 new	 attitudes	 and	 values	 have	 been	 fully	
internalized	 (i.e.	 Type	 II	 socialization),	 or	 to	 adjudicate	 on	 the	 presence	 or	 absence	 of	
normative	suasion	as	a	socializing	mechanism.	However,	the	evaluation	of	these	claims	was	
not	our	primary	purpose.	
	
Although	we	 are	 unable	 to	 contribute	 significantly	 to	 the	 debate	 about	mechanisms,	 our	
findings	 on	 scope	 conditions	 do	 provide	 some	 potential	 insights	 concerning	 the	 likely	
importance	 of	 strategic	 calculation,	 role	 playing	 and	 mimicking.	 The	 latter	 differs	 from	
strategic	adaptation	since	there	is	no	means-end	calculation	involved,	and	from	role-playing	
by	not	being	 solely	driven	by	 institutional	 structures	 (Johnston,	2005;	Murdoch	and	Geys,	
2012).	 Specifically,	 Hooghe	 (2005:	 871)	 convincingly	 argues	 that	 instrumental	 rationality	
kicks	in	predominantly	“when	an	individual’s	career	chances	are	at	stake”	(i.e.	for	younger	
individuals).	This	would	suggest	that	respondents	entering	the	Commission	at	a	younger	age	
are	more	 likely	 to	adjust	 for,	at	 least	 in	part,	 instrumental	 reasons.	Psychological	 research	
																																																						
17	 Note	 that	 a	 similar	 issue	 does	 not	 arise	 for	 our	 results	 regarding	 those	 entering	 after	 age	 30	 since	 no	
significant	 differences	 exist	 in	 age,	 year	 of	 entry	 and	 age	 at	 entry	 between	 our	matched	 sample	 and	 the	
complete	survey	samples.	
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has	 furthermore	 argued	 that	 instrumentality	 may	 be	 a	 more	 typically	 masculine	 than	
feminine	 trait	 (e.g.,	 Huddy	 and	 Terkildsen,	 1993,	 and	 references	 therein).	 Since	 the	
attitudinal	changes	we	observe	are	strongest	among	women	and	staff	with	a	higher	age	at	
entry,	these	lines	of	argument	suggest	that	mechanisms	including	role	playing	or	mimicking	
might	be	particularly	relevant	within	our	setting.	One	speculation	is	that	gender	imbalances	
in	 staff	 composition	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 female	 role	models	may	 result	 in	 greater	 use	 of	
role-playing	or	mimicking	on	the	part	of	women.	This	interpretation	is	further	strengthened	
when	 considering	 that	we	 exploit	 organizational	 changes	 to	 identify	 causal	 effects	 in	 our	
analysis.	 The	 reason	 is	 that	 role	 playing	 as	 a	mechanism	 underlying	 attitudinal	 change	 is	
often	 linked	to	organizational	structures	 inducing	 individuals	to	enact	organization-specific	
roles	(Murdoch	and	Geys,	2012).	
	
Conclusion	
Despite	the	importance	of	the	issue,	the	IR	literature	has	hitherto	been	unable	to	deliver	an	
authoritative	answer	on	whether	IGOs	shape	the	values	of	the	people	who	work	for	them.	
Since	IGOs	have	become	a	near	ubiquitous	presence	and	exert	influence	on	virtually	every	
area	 of	 life	 (Barnett	 and	 Finnemore,	 1999;	 Costa	 and	 Jorgensen,	 2012),	 this	 is	 a	 serious	
limitation.	Although	IR	schools	of	thought	ranging	from	neo-functionalism	to	constructivism	
have	 clear	 theoretical	 expectations	 regarding	 the	 acquisition	 of	 values	 in	 IGOs,	 empirical	
scholarship	thus	far	betrays	significant	shortcomings.	Lack	of	access	to	longitudinal	data	in	
particular	has	 imposed	 important	 constraints	on	 the	validity	and	 robustness	of	 the	claims	
existing	studies	can	support	(Martin	and	Simmons,	1998;	Beyers,	2010),	as	well	as	the	range	
of	hypotheses	that	could	be	tested.	Drawing	on	unique	new	data	from	two	surveys	within	
the	 European	 Commission	 in	 2008	 and	 2014,	 this	 article	 advanced	 understanding	 of	
international	socialization	in	three	ways.		
	
First,	this	article	has	 identified	and	addressed	two	central	weaknesses	 in	 IR	scholarship	on	
international	socialization:	a	methodological	shortcoming	whereby	scholars	have	depended	
on	 cross-sectional	 data	 to	 analyze	 an	 essentially	 dynamic	 process,	 and	 a	 theoretical	
shortcoming	whereby	datasets	based	on	narrow	staff	 strata	 restricted	 the	possibilities	 for	
theorizing	and	empirically	evaluating	scope	conditions.	In	response	to	the	first,	our	analysis	
builds	 on	 a	 two-wave	 survey	 design	 to	 examine	 socialization	 as	 a	 diachronic	 process	 in	
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longitudinal	 terms	 –	 using	 repeated	 observations	 from	 the	 same	 person	 over	 time.	 In	
response	 to	 the	 second	 shortcoming,	 this	 article	 sought	 explicitly	 to	 theorize	 the	
institutional	 and	 individual	 scope	 conditions	 that	 trigger	 socialization	 effects	within	 IGOs.	
Our	 examination	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 exogenously	 imposed	 changes	 in	 an	 individual’s	
organizational	environment	in	particular	breaks	new	ground.		
	
Second,	 our	 findings	 demonstrate	 that	 international	 institutions	 can	 and	 do	 shape	 the	
values	of	policy	officers.	It	is	also	clear	that	our	results	offer	a	qualified	“yes”	to	the	question	
whether	 IGOs	trigger	socialization	effects.	Organizational	change,	gender	and	age	at	entry	
are	 crucial	 scope	 conditions	 affecting	 the	 socialization	process.	We	 should	 also	note	here	
that	our	findings	do	not	imply	that	supranational	socialization	is	unaffected	by,	for	instance,	
the	 nature	 of	 supranational	 attitudes	 or	 learning	 about	 the	 efficiency/legitimacy	 of	
supranational	organizations.	In	fact,	we	very	strongly	believe	that	these	elements	do	play	a	
role	as	well.	Yet,	such	factors	arguably	impact	upon	all	individuals	in	the	Commission	equally	
and	are	independent	of	experiencing	organizational	(in)stability.	As	such,	we	cannot	identify	
their	relevance	in	our	analysis,	and	–	as	we	note	in	footnote	11	–	their	potential	presence	
does	not	affect	our	ability	 to	address	 the	effect	of	 individuals	experiencing	organizational	
(in)stability.	
	
Third,	 insofar	 as	 they	 have	 engaged	with	 the	 socializing	 power	 of	 IGOs,	 IR	 scholars	 have	
directed	 their	 attention	 mainly	 at	 the	 institutional	 level	 (Waltz,	 1979;	 Keohane,	 1984;	
Abbott	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 Our	 approach	 is	 innovative	 in	 undertaking	 analysis	 at	 the	 level	 of	
individual	 members	 of	 staff.	 By	 offering	 new	 insights	 into	 IGOs	 as	 social	 environments	
(Johnston,	2001),	our	 research	demonstrates	 the	value	of	 individual-level	 analyses.	 It	 also	
suggests	 new	 avenues	 of	 enquiry	 –	 for	 example,	 on	 investigating	 the	 working	 of	 staff	
selection	and	 integration	policies,	 the	role	of	 leadership,	and	the	 impact	of	administrative	
reforms	on	staff	performance.	More	broadly,	 it	may	be	that	 individual-level	analysis	offers	
the	 most	 promising	 route	 for	 identifying	 the	 causal	 mechanisms	 –	 either	 arguing	 or	
bargaining	 (see	 also	 footnote	 7;	 Johnston,	 2001,	 2005;	 Zürn	 and	 Checkel,	 2005)	 –	 that	
scholars	claim	are	in	operation	at	different	stages	of	the	socialization	process.	This	would	be	
an	 important	 step	 towards	 understanding	 not	 only	whether	 certain	 groups	 of	 individuals	
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witness	attitudinal	changes	in	IGOs	under	certain	contextual	settings	–	as	we	illustrate	in	our	
analysis	–	but	also	why	and	how	such	changes	arise.	
	
Our	 findings	 are	based	on	 a	 case	 study	of	 a	 single	 critical	 institution,	 but	 they	 suggest	 at	
least	four	possible	lines	of	future	research.	First,	the	discussion	in	this	article	has	focused	on	
policy	 officers.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 they	 are	 particularly	 susceptible	 to	 the	 acquisition	 of	 pro-
internationalist	values.	Extending	the	analysis	to	other	staff	categories	or	comparing	value	
acquisition	among	sub-categories	of	policy	officers	–	 for	example,	between	managers	and	
staff	 in	 non-management	 positions	 –	 may	 reveal	 additional	 scope	 conditions.	 Similarly,	
broadening	the	analysis	to	a	representative	sample	of	the	entire	workforce	would	make	it	
possible	 to	 test	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 scope	 conditions	 –	 a	 second	 potential	 line	 of	 enquiry.	
Candidates	 include	 location	 (since	 there	may	 be	 an	 ‘HQ	effect’),	 educational	 background,	
nationality,	 or	 previous	 employment.	 A	 third	 possibility	 involves	 comparison	 of	 the	
European	 Commission	 with	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 EU	 administration	 or	 other	 international	
institutions.	The	aim	would	be	 to	examine	 the	extent	 to	which	different	 institutions	exert	
different	levels	of	socializing	influence	on	their	staff,	and	what	institutional	or	organizational	
properties	account	 for	any	 such	difference.	 Finally,	 the	 limited	number	of	observations	 in	
our	 final	 panel	 dataset	 precluded	 evaluating	 whether	 –	 and,	 if	 so,	 to	 what	 extent	 –	
particularly	 policy	 fields	 within	 the	 Commission	 show	 more	 openness	 to	 international	
socialization.	 This	 would	 be	 interesting	 to	 consider	 in	 future	 research	 as	 employees	 in	
different	policy	fields	not	only	have	different	ways	of	working,	but	also	vary	in	terms	of	the	
internal	prestige	of	their	direct	work	environment.	All	four	possibilities	would	require	data	
of	 greater	 scope	 and	 scale	 than	 hitherto	 available,	 but,	 as	 the	 above	 discussion	 has	
demonstrated,	 that	 is	 the	 cost	 for	 further	 advancing	 the	 understanding	 of	 international	
institutions	as	socializing	environments.	
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